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PREFACE

We are living in a time of destabilizing political and legal changes. Often,
it seems difficult to know whether we are at war or at peace; to determine
what sort of conflict is at stake in a given situation; and, relatedly, to
decide how best to address the conflict and to protect the persons, peoples, and/or states that it threatens. While both the end of polarized relations and the advent of globalization have their app~al, the renewed
engagement has frequently seemed to mean that we see the possibility of
intervention, but that hope is too often thwarted. Yet the closer we.look,
the more one can see that this situation has too frequently been viewed
from a twentieth-century, state-centered perspective. Recently, there
have been.profound changes in the nature-of interstate relations and conflict-all of which have pointed in the direction of the paradigm shift
toward humanity law and, to some extent, away from interstate international law, that is identified here.
After I finished my first book Transitional Justice, which explored legal
and political responses to the transitions characterizing the end of the
twentieth century, it became apparent that-despite lurches toward liberal
democratic peace-conflict and violence not only were here to stay, but in
some regard were ever more conspicuous, at least insofar as they were having a vivid impact on civilians. Indeed, it seemed that it was precisely during fragile transitions-that is, moments of weakness-that states were at
their most vulnerable.
Another puzzle that arose was that of the role oflaw, and why legal mechanisms and solutions seemed to proliferate. How could this development
best be explained? It was clear that the lens we were using-whichviewed
situations from a state-centric perspective-e-lackedsufficient explanatory
power. But why might that be? Thelaw's role seemed problematic, given the
changes we had witnessed in the nature of the violence. It was necessaryto
ask: To what extent is the law addressing the real sources of conflict? What
sort of law should properly be applied to twenty-first-century conflicts?
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Other changes, too, are under way, leading us to ask: Exactly who is the
current subject in foreign affairs today? And, in a concededly globalizing
politics, what exactly might be the role of actors beyond the state? Large
numbers of civilians were being affected by conflict, and accordingly, it was
vital to examine the role of a human-centered (not state-centered) politics
and law in the search for legitimacy. Compounded vulnerabilities speak
to other identities, which in turn illuminated the extraordinary rise in
ethnic conflict. These persistent questions gave rise to the exploration
here into the conditions for, the status of, and the changing role for law.
They have led me to postulate that we are witnessing at least a partial
change of legal regime, departing from the preexisting interstate regime
and moving toward a regime I term "humanity law"-that is, the law of
persons and peoples.
Pursuing a project of this sort necessitated taking an interdisciplinary
perspective, as it involved exploring some of the legal developments in
relation to (and as enmeshed in) politics and conflict. In this journey, I have
been fortunate to have support and feedback from numerous workshops,
colloquia, and institutions. Early ideas were presented at the Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Colloque on World Civility,
Ethical Norms and Transnational Diffusion (October 2002); Yale Law
School, Globalization Seminar (May 2003); University of Essex Centre for
Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences Seminar (October
2003) and its International Law Seminar in November 2005; and the
University of Tel Aviv, Law and History Colloquium (April 2004), as well as
the University's law-school-faculty

workshop.

Ideas were further devel-

oped through the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of
Global Governance, International
Law Seminar (November 2005).
Moreover, ideas about the direction of global justice evolved at Hebrew
University, in a short course on that subject at the law school, where I
guest-taught in the summer of 2007.
Portions of chapter 4, on justice and war, were presented at my alma
mater, Cornell Law School, at its C~nference on Global Justice, in remarks
responding to "Just War and the Noncombatant Defense" (April 2006), which
were published as "Wages of Just War," in the Cornell Law School symposium
issue (Cornell International Law Journal 39 [2006]). In the fall of 2006, I was
grateful for the support of the University of Connecticut's Human Rights
Institute, where I was given a visiting Gladstein Chair for Human Rights, as
a result of which I gave three university-wide talks. These began with an overarching view of the project, "For Humanity: The Emerging Shift in the Rule of
Law in Global Politics," and ended with a presentation on the evolution of the
law toward a humanity law regime at the University of Connecticut Faculty
Workshop (November 2006).
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Over the next year, various chapters of this book benefited from workshops at American University, Washington College of Law; Georgetown
Law School's Constitutional Law Colloquium; Harvard Law School's
International Law Colloquium workshop series; and the Columbia Law
SchoolAssociates Series, where I presented at its international law seminar.
Chapter 3 benefited from discussions at Columbia University's Associatesin-Law Workshop Series (February 2007); and a Fall Speaker series where
I presented "Humanity's Law: Regulating a World of Conflict" hosted by
Columbia Law School'sCenter for Global LegalProblems (October 2007). '
In my last sabbatical, 2007-2008, I am grateful to Yale Law School for
support in the way of an Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International
Human Rights Fellowship, and for the feedback of students and faculty
in the Schell Human Rights workshop, where I presented parts of this
book (specifically, chapter 3). That spring, I was a visiting professor at
Fordham Law School, where the Faculty Workshop offered a most hospitable environment to present parts of the book, particularly chapter 5.
During that sabbatical, I was invited to teach at Columbia University, in
the Politics Department, arid benefited from presenting at the Columbia
University Politics Speaker Series on November 7, 2008. I am also grateful to Fordham University Law School for discussions of chapter 3 that
occurred in March 2008. Moreover, ideas on humanity law as the basis for
interpretation, as discussed in chapter 7, benefited from presentation at
Fordham Law School's International Law and International Relations
Theory Colloquium,as well as from part of an international law conference
on interpretation and the Constitution, which would later be published in
Fordham Law School's Symposium Issue, "International Law and the
Constitution: Terms of Engagement" (2008). My discussion of the area of
applied humanity law in the global antiterror campaign benefited from a
presentation at Oxford University's Roundtable entitled "Human Rights
and the War on Terror," convened by David Rodin in November 2008.
Chapter 4 benefited from a presentation at Georgetown International
Human Rights Colloquiumin January 2008, and a presentation at Temple
Law School's International Law Workshop in April 2008. I am grateful for
exchanges relating to humanity law at London School of Economics over
the last years in my capacity as visiting professor in Global Governance.
My home institution, New York Law School, has been very supportive, through its summer grant research assistance program and the
Ernst C. Stiefel Chair, which for some years now has supported my research.
Having had a chance to get to know the late Ernst Stiefel and his dynamic
view of international law, I believe that he would have liked this book. I am
very grateful to the New YorkLaw Schoollaw library staff, and particularly
to Ms. Camille Broussard and Margaret Butler. I also owe an enormous
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debt to my terrific research assistants at New York Law School, without
whom this book would not have been possible-most recently Luna Droubi,
who somehow balanced this with her editorial role on the Law Review,
Aman Shareef, as well as my former research assistants over the last three
years: Sandra Dubow, Diane Bradshaw, Eric Grossmann, Theresa Loken,
and William Vidal. I would also like to convey my gratitude and admiration
to Human Rights Watch for their excellent research reports. In this project,
as always, my assistant Stan Schwartz has been invaluable in word
processing and other assistance.
Many friends and colleagues have been helpful: I owe thanks especially
to my editor at Oxford, David McBride, who saw a spark in this project, and
to three anonymous reviewers, all of whom pushed me in important directions. I would also like to express my appreciation for the helpful comments
ofBillAlford, Michael Dorf, Michael Doyle, Martin Flaherty, Ryan Goodman,
Aeyal Gross, Tom Lee, Joanne Mariner, Jeremy Paul, Iavor Rangelov,
Anthony Sebok, Jack Snyder, Peter Spiro, Simon Teitel, Mark Tushnet, and
Richard Wilson. To my family, many thanks for the distraction that is their
humanity. Most of all, I am indebted to Rob Howse for his deep thinking
and profound solidarity on this project.

CHAPTER 1

dv:)-

Introduction
Every Man, as Man has a Right to claim the Aid of other Men, in Necessity. And every
Person is obliged to give it to him, if in his Power by the Laws of Humanity..
.
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book 2, chapter-Zb (1853)
(A]n evaluation of international right and wrong, which heretofore existed only.in the
heart of mankind, has now been written into the books of men as the Law of Humanity.
This law is not restricted to events of war. It envisages the protection of humanity at all
times.
Opinion and judgment of the tribunal of the Einsatzgruppen case (1948)
When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.
Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty" (1999)
To brush aside America's responsibility as a leader and-more profoundly-our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal
of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries.
The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the
images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.
Barack Obama, Remarks on Libya (March 28, 2011)

T

he end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes for a new peace, to be
cemented by multilateral institutions and inspired by universal law.
But, in short order, the collapse of communism released a wave of
political violence. Therefolloweda range of interventions and engagements
undertaken in the name of "humanity"-from Kosovo to Darfur, to
Afghanistan and Iraq. We have been confronted with new kinds of conflicts. The obsolescence or inadequacy of long-standing devices and
doctrines-such as nuclear deterrence, spheres of influence, and "contain-

..
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merit" approaches-to effectively manage conflict has become increasingly
apparent. From the Balkans to Africa to the Middle East, we see a rising
number of weak and failed states and increasing political fragmentation,
civil strife, displacement, and migration, and we witness the plight of peoples whose very survival is under threat. Terrorism and religious extremism
add to the pervasive sense of volatility and existential insecurity.
This history has created the context for a transformation in the relationship of law to violence in global politics. The normative foundations of the
international legal order have shifted from an emphasis on state securitythat is, security as defined by borders, statehood, territory, and so on-to
a focus on human security: the security of persons and peoples.1 In an
unstable and insecure world, the law of humanity-a framework that spans
the law of war, international human rights law, and international criminal
justice-reshapes the discourse of international relations.
Courts, tribunals, other international bodies, and political actors draw
from the various elements of the framework, in assessing the rights and
wrongs of conflict; determining whether and how to intervene; and
imposing accountability and responsibility on both state and nonstate
actors. In interpreting and elaborating the law of humanity, courts, tribunals, and other agents have had to address tensions between, and gaps
within, the different traditional doctrinal sources of humanity law. In so
doing, they have expanded rights and responsibilities to encompass wider
and wider circles of conduct, and additional actors within conflicts. At the
same time, they have also increased the legal responsibilities of states, even
for the behavior of nonstate actors the Bosnian Serb militias, for example,
in the case of Tadic,while exhibiting less deference to the traditional sovereign prerogatives of states, where doing so would interfere with the overriding goal of protecting persons and peoples.
All this engages the sources, content, institutions,

and agents of

international law. The law of war has traditionally included both jus in
hello-which

addresses the manner in which war is waged-and jus ad

hellum, which sets the legal rules that determine whether going to war is
permissible in the first place. Jus ad hellum has mostly been codified in
the UN Charter, which bans the use of force by states against other
states, except in self-defense or with the authorization of the Security
Council.2 Jus in hello is codified to a significant extent in the postwar
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol, substantial parts of which
are now regarded as customary international law, binding on the entire
community of states.
Among the most important norms set out in Common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions are the prohibitions on murder, torture, and
cruel treatment. The targeting of civilians is prohibited; the principle of
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proportionality requires the avoidance of excessiveforce, demanding that
it be proportionate to a legitimate military objective; and humane standards of treatment for prisoners of war are set forth. Additional Protocol 1
to the Geneva Conventions pertains to civilwars and is also widely considered to be operative as "customaryinternational law."Protocol 1, Article 48
formulates the basic rule relating to the protection of civilians-a treaty
formulation of the customary rule of discrimination, aimed at ensuring
respect for, and protection of, the civilian population and civilian objects.,
Theseduties primarily fall upon the signatory states, while the most serious
are now enforced by international criminal tribunals.
Next, there is human rights law. The international law of human rights
engages states in peacetime, primarily to protect certain individual and
group rights of those who reside in their territory. But as the International
Court of Justice has opined, its application extends to armed conflict as
well, subject to relevant limits.
Thisbody oflaw is usually said to have its source in the postwar Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Many of the. rights in the Declaration·have
been elaborated in the International Covenant on Civiland PoliticalRights,
a multilateral instrument that is binding on the majority of the world's
states, and that is enforcedvia an elaborate institutional apparatus for m\:mitoring compliance and hearing complaints. The Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has been more controversial, especially during
the ColdWar,when East-Westideologicaltensions were reflected in differing views on the meaning-and in some cases, on the very legitimacy-of
the Covenant on Economic,Socialand Cultural Rights. (TheUnited States is
still not fullybound as a party to this covenant.) Now,increasingly,as willbe
seen, these kinds of rights are the subject of litigation and decisionmaking
in the Inter-Americanand European regimes and tribunals among others.
Finally,also informing the humanity law framework is the law of international criminal justice, which is closely associated with international
humanitarian law, as it has evolved since the end of the last world war.
Under the law of international criminal justice, enforcement focuses on
individuals. This approach may be seen as beginning with the landmark
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and drawing from the law of
war. It is central to the Torture Convention, and to the charters of the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals that were constituted after genocides
in Europe and Africa. This approach also characterizes the proceedings of
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC),and encompasses the
concept of "universal jurisdiction," as well as widespread norms that universallyprohibit the most egregiousof offenses, such as torture and slavery
("jus cogens"). Such norms allow-and, indeed, may even require-the
prosecutioi'i of offenders by any state.thatis able to do so.
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This book maps the rise of humanity law, and considers how that body
of law is shaped by, and is reshaping, each of the three international legal
regimes just discussed. While the book does not espouse a formal fusion of
rules or doctrines, I argue that humanity law provides a framework that
both legal and political actors employ in today's world, as they confront the
challenges of conflict and of insecurity. This framework is most evidently at
work in the jurisprudence of the tribunals-international, regional, and
domestic-that are charged with applying a diverse range of legal materials
to particular disputes, disputes that often span issues of internal and international conflict and security. Thus, throughout this book, I will discuss
and analyze this jurisprudence. Most international legal scholarship focuses
on individual regimes or tribunals, as if they operated in a relatively
self-contained way. But under that approach, it is easy to miss the evolution of a jurisprudence that is being generated by a normative and interpretive framework that operates across these divides, and connects the
mandates and decisions of diverse tribunals and institutions.
I explore the humanity law phenomenon by looking to its historical
roots, its contemporary tendencies, and its effect on the discourse of international relations. By opting for this approach, I am seeking to elucidate
the new dilemmas of engagement in global politics, and the increasing
overlap and interconnection between the law of war and the law of peace;
between international and other levels of legal order (domestic, regional,
even subnational); and between and among the regimes regulating the
public and private spheres.
Today, when violent conflict is conspicuous and pervasive in parts of the
world, the law of war is expanding alongside the parameters of contemporary
transnational conflict. 3 Heightened violence, particularly across state borders, coincides with the ascendance of a humanity-driven discourse in
politics.4 I will elucidate the tension between the ascendant rule of law and
the management of the use of force, by exploring the changed law of humanity
and its impact on the traditional law of war and human rights law.
The shift in the role of law in managing conflict reflects a changed
political consciousness-and the change at issue goes to the very values
and principles associated with legality itself. The law and discourse of
humanity law are penetrating the sphere of foreign policy decisionmaking,
as can be seen in the increasing frequency with which situations of conflict
that have hit a political impasse are being referred to court-as has
occurred, for example, in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Darfur, Lebanon, and
most recently Libya.
~oreover, as we will see, this framework informs our analysis of globalization and the current economic crisis-raising the vital question "What do we
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owe each other?" The "responsibilityto protect" ("RtoP")means, in the first
instance, the duty of the state to protect its citizens against the worst sorts
of politicalviolence,such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. But even absent
those extreme circumstances,that duty still points to a shared responsibility.
The kinds of legal norms that are often assumed to be epiphenomenal (that
is, functioning largely outside a given situation, and retrospectively) in
politics-for instance, the norms imposedby the lawsof war regardinglimits
on harm to civilians-are now invoked prospectively,to justify military.
interventions, such as those that have occurredin Kosovo,Afghanistan, Iraq,
and recently Libya.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization sought to justify
its bombing of Kosovoand Serbiaby making the followingstatement before
the World Court, in which the very purpose of armed intervention is argued
in legalterms: "Tosafeguard... essential valueswhich also rank as jus cogens.
Are the right to life, physicalintegrity, the prohibition of torture, are these
not norms with the status of jus cogens?"5 Similar justifications to limit
political violence against solutions appear in the Security Council'sresolution legalizingthe intervention in Libya:"[a]uthoriz[ing]MemberStates ... to
take all necessary measures,... to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack.''6
The extent to which this new (or transformed) language of justification
is actually altering states' perceptions of their interests, and changing the
underlyingdeterminants of state behavior is, of course, a matter for further
social-scientificinvestigation and debate. But the first step to take here is
to properly define and understand the grammar and syntax, as it were, of the
new language of justification; its origins; and how it has developed in
response to changing political realities.
The interstate system is challengedby the claims of new subjects such as
persons and peoples, organized along affiliativeties (such as race, religion,
and ethnicity) that extend beyond the state and even beyond nationality.
These claims range from demands for secession and sovereignty to assertions of novel rights, to claims for protection, assistance, and accountability for past wrongs, both individual- and group-based. We also see the
interstate system facilitating both the civil and the criminal accountability
of nonstate actors, while making a strong statement about the universal
reach of the rule of law,and the universalizablecontent of the corehumanity
law norms.
These developments have gone hand in hand with the rise of nonstate
actors in international law as bearers of both rights and duties, and the
interconnected tendency toward judicialization. Here, one thinks ~f the
emergence of international criminal law processes and institutions, as well
as the prevailing
regional courts, and how they are being shaped by individ._
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uals' involvement in adjudication, and also of the appellate jurisprudence
of the World Trade Organizaticn-s-a legal system that formally remains
within the classic interstate model yet is unable in its lawmaking to resist
the shift to non-state-centric subjectivity, as seen by its judge-made
decisions entertaining amicus submissions from nonstate actors and in its
decision to open hearings to the public.7
What might explain the appeal of the new humanitarianism? To what
extent does it play to the longing for universalism in a divisive and skeptical
age? Is it perhaps addressing the failure of traditional state-based processes
and institutions to cope with, and adjust to, changed political realities?

THE PARADIGM SHIFT

At issue is the extended reach of legality. This extension takes as a departure
point classic conceptions of state sovereignty and state interests, and moves
toward the incorporation of humanitarian concerns (such as concerns for the
protection of the rights to life of persons and peoples) as a crucial element in
the justification of state action. Under the classic state-sovereignty-based
approach, states were largely unconstrained in terms of what they did within
their own borders (except for the minim us standards relating to the treatment
of aliens-the

law of diplomatic protection). And externally, apart from jus

cogens, states were constrained only by norms to which they had consented,
either by explicit agreement (as in the case of conve~tional law), or by state
practice andopiniojuris (as in the case of customary law). As it developed with
the UN Charter, this system contemplated only very limited justifications for
the use of force: Force could be justified only by the need for the maintenance
or reestablishment of international peace and security, and only where
authorized or coordinated multilaterally (through the Security Council).
Accordingly, Article 2 ( 4) of the UN Charter provides as follows: "All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."
The UN Charter did recognize one exception: the "inherent" right of
self-defense. For, Article 51 provides that, "nothing ... shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs." At least until the Security Council had been able to act, the right to
self-defense may be exercised unilaterally or through other collective institutions (such as NATO, etc.). Of course, as conceded by the 1990s-era UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in reality, this "old orthodoxy" was never
absolute. The UN Charter, after all, was issued in the name of "the peoples,"
not the governments, of the United Nations. As Annan has commented,
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the Charter's aim was not only to preserve international peace but also "to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person"; thus, Annan observed, "TheCharter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to
trample on human rights and human dignity."8
Over the last decade, humanitarianism's meaning for the international
legal system has been hotly contested. For some, humanitarianism has
become a source of resistance to economicglobalization.Yet humanitarian.
law is actually redefining the struggle for justice in terms that focus not on
the preservation of state autonomy against the global legal order, but on
the effects of law on persons and peoples, and on our evolvingunderstandings of human security. In Arman'swords,
state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not
forces of globalisation and international co-operation.

least by the

States are now widely

understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.
At the same time individual. sovereignty-by .which I mean the Fundamerital
freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent
international treaties-has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are mon;
than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to
protect those who abuse them.9

For centuries, international law worked hand-in-glove with statism to
reinforce modern nation-building. The commitment to self-determination
as set out in Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States was qualified by the
sanctity of borders, and the persistence of the traditional doctrine of recognition, which looked to facts such as control of territory (as embodied in
the Montevideo Convention). From the basic understanding of security
that is spelled out in the UN Charter and through to the baseline of state
responsibility, and even to the understandings of rights in the international sphere, the state-centeredvision still held sway. But that vision is
now in the process of being transformed and relativized by a normative
order that is grounded in the protection of humanity. Drawing from the
postwar moment, as Justice Robert H. Jackson declared at Nuremberg, it
has become clear that "humanity need not supplicate for a Tribunal in
which to proclaim its rights .... Humanity can assert itself by law. It has taken
on the robe of authority."10
•
Of course, sovereignty is in no way disappearing, but it is losing its traditional status of primacy in the legal ordering that governs matters that
~

(10)

Humanity's Law

occur beyond the level of the individual state. Sovereignty is no longer a
self-evident foundation for international law. This shift is driving the move
from the state-centric normative discourse of global politics-which had
prevailed until recently-to

a far-ranging, transnational discourse in which

references to changed subjectivity have consequences.

That new discourse

is constructed more along humanity law lines.
Debates about the legality and legitimacy of the use of force by states
increasingly center on the rights and claims of persons and peoples rather
than on the interests and prerogatives of states as such. More and more,
humanity law is being extended beyond situations that involve protected
persons in interstate conflict to situations that occur outside international
conflict, under both national and international supervision. Examples of
such situations include interventions or protracted occupations, or involve
the "war on terror."
Humanitarian commitments

have been broadened

and deepened by

treaties providing for new forms of conflict regulation of a humanitarian
nature, such as the Landmines Convention, and by certain UN Security
Council processes and resolutions. Humanitarian enforcement has also
been furthered by new regional or international judiciaries, such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC), that are invested with various new
supervisory and adjudicatory powers. Yet because the ICC lacks certain
enforcement resources (such as a police force), the ICC must depend on
state and interstate cooperation to bring the accused before the court,
detain suspects, acquire evidence, and so forth. Security Council actions
are now not just operating on the state but also-and increasingly-targeting individuals and holding them responsible. This dynamic can be seen
especially in the war on terror, where sanctions have been imposed on identified individuals who are alleged to have some involvement in terror.
More institutions are invested with juridical law enforcement powers
that are meant to allow them to protect humanity law-related rights and
duties. Among these institutions are international and regional tribunalsfor example, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the ICC, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. Meanwhile, domestic courts, too, consider humanity law
claims involving violations of the law of nations, under customary law and
doctrines of "extraterritorial" or universal jurisdiction. For example, the
UK House of Lords accepted that Spain had jurisdiction to try deposed
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for violations of jus cogens prohibitions of, and protections against, torture so long as the conduct was seen
as criminal under the UK law at the time. Such developments reframe and
reconceptualize the meaning of accountability in the international realm,
enabling a move away from the state and its collective responsibility,
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through the reconception of the law in terms of the primacy of individual
responsibility. This reconceptualization is creating alternative and potentially independent paths to conflict resolution, occurring often without
explicit state consent while arguably also, over time, building a sense of
shared global community.

INTERNATIONAL

CRISES REFLECT THE SHIFT

The 1648 Westphalia Peace Treaty allowed states to acknowledge each
other's exclusive authority, and created a defining split between international and domestic law, relegating interstate conflict to the orbit of international law. This "classic" international law was rarely enforced or
interpreted by courts and tribunals. Instead, it usually elaborated by small
circle of academiccommentators and "foreign office"legal.advisers. Classic
international law was often regarded as autonomous-that is, entirely separate from any nation's domestic law-though .some constitutional "traditions, such as that of the United States, incorporated elements of
international law, as discussed by David Golove.11
Thus, in the words of the International CriminalTribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the tribunal held that "a
state-sovereignty-oriented approach have [sic] been gradually supplanted
by a human-being-oriented approach.... Why protect civiliansfrom belligerent violence or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals,
churches ... as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, a:ndyet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence
has erupted 'only' within the territory of a sovereign State."12
In present political conditions, there is a growing gap between the older
bases of legalityand contemporary understandings of legitimacy,which are
informed by an evolving norm of humanity law. For example, "emerging
slowlybut ... surelyis an international norm against the violent repression of
minorities that will and must take precedenceover concerns of State sovereignty."13
Thenew understanding of legitimacyis reflectedin a reshapedlegal
order, staked out in terms of interests in humanity.The relationshipbetween
this new, altered legalorder and the subsisting traditional order "of interstate
relations, embodiedby sourcessuch as the UNCharter's rules on use of force,
remains tense and unresolved.

a

The international community'sfailure to respond to the Rwandan genocide, coming on the heels of Bosnia, prompted a marked shift in expectations about
the protection of humanity. In particular; there emerged a
IC
strong demand to protect humanity rights, even if state sovereigntyhad to
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be compromised-as, for example, through military intervention. In the
words of then Secretary-General Annan, "it has cast in stark relief the
dilemma of what has been called humanitarian intervention: on one side,
the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization
without a UN mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative
of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with
grave humanitarian consequences."14
When ethnic persecution returned to the heart of Europe, it eventually led
to NATO military action, including the bombing of Serbia's capital, Belgrade,
on the basis of the need to enforce humanity rights. The long-standing
prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense or with the Security
Council's approval was jettisoned in favor of a claim to the right to wage a
"just war" in the name of humanity. More generally, responses to contemporary foreign affairs crises involving weak states and large-scale human rights
violations display the limits of the classic view of international legality,
which has been premised on state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In
the case of NATO's bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, a subsequent investigation by the UN-appointed Independent Commission of Experts concluded
that the NATO military intervention was "illegal but legitimate." The
Commission concluded that the intervention was illegal because it lacked
prior approval from the UN Security Council. Yet in the Commission's eyes,
the intervention was still justified because all diplomatic avenues had been
exhausted, and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the
majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under
Serbian rule.15
Hence, for many in the international community, the effort to put a
decisive end to "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo was thought to be justified
morally, even if not legally, as an otherwise unauthorized NATO intervention. Now, the way has been paved for a "duty of protection" to be invoked,
regarding the possibility of intervention in places like Darfur and, as was
recently seen in the first Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention in Libya, taken up at chapter 4. The recognition of a responsibility
for the protection of others is also seen in the emerging "human security"
focus of a range of political and legal fora and actors-for
example, in the
United Nations, and in the Human Security Commission and Report, where
appeals to justice increasingly are being framed and justified in humanity
law terms.
Various post-9/11 political developments have accelerated the rise of
the humanity-centered regime. Fear of terrorism, coupled with the concern
about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has heightened
anxiety regarding the potential for humanitarian disaster on a global scale.
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In an increasingly interdependent world, few discernable lines demarcate
interstate interests in security from interests that are based simply on
our common humanity. As former U.S. president Bill Clinton put it,
"philosophers and theologians have talked for millennia about how we are
interdependent because of our shared humanity. Politicians have taken it
seriously at least since the end of World War II, the dropping of the bomb,
and the establishment of the United Nations. But now it is a reality that no
ordinary citizen of the world anywhere can escape."16

THE DILEMMAS OF GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
AND HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION

As noted, the humanity law framework reconceivessecurity in term; of the
protection and preservation of persons and peoples. Once the relevant subjects and goals in the international realm are reconceived in this way, the
meaning and challenges of. security in both ~ar and peacetime become
blurred. Contemporary conflict is complex: There are a large number of
situations where humanity rights are at staJ:ethat cannot easily be classified
as either a state of war in the classicsense or a state of peace or normal legality.
Under classicalinternational law,the state enjoyed a monopoly on the use of
violencewithin its territory-aprecept that informed the traditional view of
revolutionaryand secessionistmovements, and that has its sourcein the early
modem political thought that created the grounding of classicalliberalism,
going back to Hobbes,and others. But that precept becomes highly problematic when the law is made in the name not of states but of humanity; and
when the law supports claimsnot only for universalhuman rights but also the
self-determination of peoples. Suchclaimshave spurred a demand for forceful
intervention in "humanity's"name, not in the name of the state.
Meanwhile, too, the trend toward the legalization of conflict has arguably marginalized, or even displaced, elements of normative political and
diplomatic discourse. Hence, we can see, for example, in the Middle East,
that the political claims underlying violent conflict in the last war in
Lebanon and the intervention in Gaza have now taken second stage to
competing claims concerning humanity law violations. Genuine political
and ideological conflict reemerges, but as a conflict over humanity's multiple meanings and, in particular, over what rights pertain to peoples. Such
a contest, however, occurs among diffuse actors, in many sites at once,
Present political conditions pose a real challenge to the universal realization of human security, and put into question the degree to which humanity
rights are protectable on a transnational basis.

..
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In the chapters that follow, I seek to articulate and elucidate the
implications of a humanity-centered

global turn. The new "humanity law"

translates into a changed language for policymaking, and describes the
transformation of international normative order: its constitutive principles, processes, and values. The book confronts and seeks to discern both
order in and tension among a rich, interrelated set of legal materials and
phenomena-including multilateral treaties and conventions; the foreignrelations-related decisions of domestic courts; the writings of international
legal scholars; the advocacy of NGOs and popular movements; the rulings
of international courts and tribunals; debates about legality in diplomatic
and political fora (such as the UN Security Council); and even, to some
extent, in the media and in domestic politics. This is a greatly expanded
juridical-philosophical landscape, where, as I shall show, arguments, doctrines, and interpretations shift with great speed from one site to another,
and from one level of political or social ordering to another. Tracing the
logic that governs these movements-a

logic that is susceptible,

significant extent, I argue, to a "humanity law" interpretation-is

to a

a major

goal of this book.

A ROADMAP

Chapter 2 addresses the genesis and evolution of humanity law. At each
stage or moment of its development, humanity law has been sharpened by
the particulars of its political conditions and structures. In this chapter,
I also explore affinities with earlier periods-for example, the older law of
empire and the premodern "just war" tradition.
This genealogy elucidates the normative force of humanitarianism, and
its potential for transnational diffusion. This value is apt to transcend
national and cultural differences. Yet the prospect of universalizing
humanity law's extension across state borders can come into genuine
tension with political realities relating to the maintenance of the interstate
system. The problem of humanitarian intervention arises today within the
context of post-Cold War global realities that, unlike their historical counterparts, are distinguished by interconnection-yet lack of integration.
This situation points to the relevance, and importance, of humanity law as
a transnational juridical framework. Despite its universalizing appeal,
humanity law is inevitably particular, and associated with the distinctive
politics of the time and place: Neither progress nor return, here is a multilayered, normative framework that best captures the tension, and constitutes the principles, that are apt to guide the present global order.
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Chapter 3 articulates the book's central claim, concerning a paradigm
shift in the rule of law. It aims to delineate the salient dimensions of the
proposed legal framework, by identifying humanity law's discursive and
constitutive roles in global politics and economic concerns. Humanitycentered law constitutes. a leading contemporary discourse. Reaching
beyond the state and the prevailing international system, it offers a new
basis for legitimation and interpretation-first,
of many traditionally diffuse and diverse legal norms and doctrines and structures in international
law, and second (more tentatively but equally importantly),

of political

actions and claims. This capacious discourse involves diverse political
actors, both state and nonstate, reflecting its widespread presence and persuasiveness as a language of justification.
In addition, chapter 3 reviews the dimensions that characterize the
humanity law regime; its changed subjectivity in the international system,
as it moves beyond states to persons and peoples; its applicability beyond
instances of conflict; and its guarantee of minimum order. The humanity
law regime, as it extends across the law of war and human rights law,
reaches beyond states and their interests and obligations, to the rights and
responsibilities

of persons and peoples. Despite the emergence of the

humanity law regime, many institutional structures are not yet formally
changing, and therefore, given institutionalrigiclity, there are concomitant
tensions. Such tensions make it all the more important to adopt appropriate principles of interpretation,
(a subject taken up in chapter 7).

so that the transition may be managed

New forms of humanity-based

law are aimed at bridging the gap bet-

ween prevailing forms of legality and changing sources of legitimacy. In
this context, the proliferation of decentered adjudicatory processes and
fora is aimed at fairly representing and reconciling diverse and potentially
conflicting aims, such as the aims of justice, security, and peace, reflecting
their complex role in present-day politics.
Chapter 4 explains how humanity law frames the use of force, and
explains its legitimacy through the lens of crime and punishment. This
chapter discusses the uses of tribunals that are convened in the midst of
ethnic and political conflict. In such conflicts, the transformation

in the

perception of the legitimacy of the use of force is seen in the imperative of
adjudicating jus ad bellum, as well as in the prosecution of jus in hello, by
addressing the humanitarian violations occurring in conflict. Perhaps the
greatest departure humanity law makes from the long-standing understanding of international humanitarian law lies in its inclusion, among its
"most serious crimes" category, of the offense of "aggression," That offense,
although thus far undefined, would give the now-permanent

ICC a routine,
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ongoing authority that would extend beyond the cessation of the conflict,
as classically understoodY This development goes together with the
"normalization"

of humanity law as a regime that is applicable generally,

whether in war or peacetime.
Chapter 4 ends by evaluating the complex relationship between the uses
of punishment and the use of military force, as alternative means of protecting humanity rights. It begins by looking to the apparent rise of international criminal justice as means of enforcement of humanity rights.
Recent foreign policy discourse reflects an evident return to the concept of
the "just war" and its uses as an international sanction, At the same time,
however, this return to the "just war" concept occurs against the present
context of legalism and judicialization, which imposes· added constraints
on the waging even of an ostensible just war. This dilemma is evident in the
contemporary use of military interventions, where traditional national
security is being reconceived in terms of human security: the preservation
of persons and peoples. This chapter explores the relationship of the classic
approach to the waging of war, to the newer just war logic-showing how
these approaches and logics exist in palpable tension with one another.
Recognition of this tension, it is suggested, might well clarify the difficulties of some of today's military engagements, such as Afghanistan, Iraq,
and most recently Libya.
Chapter 5 considers the implications of the shift toward a humanitycentered perspective for a number of areas of policymaking, where security
is being reconceived in terms of the protection of persons and peoples, The
expanded humanity-based legal framework has a wide-ranging impact on
the meaning of the rule of law in foreign affairs-redefining the rule of law
in terms not just of states, but of persons and peoples as well. This chapter
will look at several case studies involving recent international controversies
that raise dilemmas about the ongoing legitimation of the use of force. It
examines situations where the existing legal order coexists with the
humanity law regime's rights-based predicates for forceful intervention, in
instances of massive humanitarian rights violations. It also asks what is
the legal scheme that is normatively appropriate for, and applicable to, the
"war against terror," Moreover, it inquires as to how the relevant debates
about this campaign also reflect the advent of the humanity-centered
response, as well as laying the basis for law enforcement-based const!uctions regarding who is inside, and outside, the relevant international
community. Under the humanity law regime, the appeal of universalizable
terms of protection, deriving from a human rights scheme, is now stronger
than ever; in the humanity-centered view of agency, responsibility devolves
on the individual,
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Changes in legal concepts of personality and agency are Inextricably
associated with related procedural and normative changes in the global
order. The heart of the human-centered perspective is that more and more
rights and responsibilities in the international system are being reframed
to extend beyond the interests of states, and to recognize the interests of
persons and peoples.Thereis a clear expansion of the proceduraldimension,
in the proliferation of tribunalization and in the increased demand for the
ability to adjudicate issues involvingindividual rights and responsibilities
in a variety of spaces, such as the European Court of Human Rights; UN
tribunals; and international, hybrid, and local fora. The normativity is also
seen in the proliferation of institutions adjudicatingjus cogens, norms seeking to provide a modicum of security for persons and peoples around the ,
world. Such norms involve,for instance, protection against crimes against
humanity and anti-genocide laws. These developments reflect the evolution of rights to human security, as they are transformed·along a procedural/ substantive divide that is importantly informing the normative
meaning of globaljustice.
Chapter 6 articulates how the humanity law framework exposes
substantive principles of justice. Therise of humanity-centered law informs
a changingconception of globaljustice that centers on a principle of human
security with formal and substantive dimensions. The rise of a discourse of
"global justice" across a br~ad range of areas" is itself evidence of the
humanity law transformation.
Across a broad swathe of areas-including politics, law, economics,
ethics, and public health-a vital vision is emerging, which depends oil a
threshold consensus on the need to guarantee the humane treatment of
persons and peoples, and ensure their preservation. Hence, under the
humanity law regime, political and economic rights and freedoms are not
artificiallyseparated. Rather, the humanity-centeredprinciples of security
and the rule of lawspan these rights regimes-thus constituting a modality
whose locus exists between human rights and the interests of states. It is
from this responsibility of care for persons and peoples that other rights
and entitlements follow. This human-security focus is reflected in the
discourse of a range of political and legal fora and actors-including multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Security Commission and
Report, where appeals to justice are being framed and justified in humanity
law terms.
Chapter 7 presents the humanity law frameworkas an interpretive lens,
examining how its teleology and normative lens informs and shapesconsciously or, often, implicitly-the way courts and tribunals (international, regional,and domestic) interpret and apply the law that governs the
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disputes before them. Some of the underlying issues include: To what
extent do individual rights stop at state borders? To what extent are
individual rights to be recognized and enforced transnationally? To what
extent are interpretations through the lenses of the humanity law framework reshaping the categories of the discourse that are dominant among
political actors, and the multiple agents of globalization?18
Chapter 8, building on the argument of the prior chapters, seeks to distill the normative contours and significance of humanity law. It explores
the implications of the shift to a humanity-centered discourse, and
humanity-centered values and institutions, for contemporary international politics. In particular, it focuses on the role of judgment and of
interpretation in clarifying humanity law norms in an ongoing way.
Beyond the role of judgment, chapter 8 examines the parameters of the
basis for the rule of law-moving beyond the state to the protection of
persons and peoples-and it shows how these policy decisions forge an
evolving conception of international

society. In the now emerging global

society, the protection of peoples is being reconceptualized-as

a protec-

tion that goes beyond the protection of the state itself, and bears a dynamic
connection to an overarching humanity. The force of the book's thesis is
that it offers a coherent account that both illuminates present-day politics
and maps the contours of an emerging vision of global social order-one
with tremendous potential for transforming human relations and creating
greater solidarity between peoples and across state borders.
Finally, the last chapter draws from prior chapters regarding the bases of
humanity law to explore the ramifications of this logic for foreign affairs, for
conflict, and for the protection of human security. Humanity law puts into
motion a comprehensive value system and set of mechanisms and processes.
This framework provides the basis for the legitimation of foreign policy
decisionmaking. Hence, understanding how a humanity law-based perspective operates practically should elucidate and contribute to a better understanding of current foreign policy controversies, particularly concerning
conflict and security. Indeed, the terms of engagement are now at the heart
of political strategy, and have become an independent goal of interventions
that are justified along humanity law lines. Finally, the conclusion seeks to
show some of the practical takeaways of the humanity law perspective that
prior chapters have articulated.

